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The Singularity, or How I Learned to Stop
Worrying and Love AI
J. Mark Bishop
Abstract Professor Stephen Hawking recently warned about the growing power of
Artificial Intelligence (AI) to imbue robots with the ability to both replicate them-
selves and to increase the rate at which they get smarter - leading to a tipping point
or ‘technological singularity’ when they can outsmart humans. In this chapter I will
argue that Hawking is essentially correct to flag up an existential danger surrounding
widespread deployment of ‘autonomous machines’, but wrong to be so concerned
about the singularity, wherein advances in AI effectively makes the human race re-
dundant; in my world AI - with humans in the loop - may yet be a force for good.
1 Background: the ‘technological’ singularity
It is not often that you are obliged to proclaim a much-loved international genius
wrong, but in his alarming prediction regarding Artificial Intelligence and the future
of humankind, I believe Professor Stephen Hawking is. Well, to be precise, being a
theoretical physicist - in an echo of Schrdinger’s cat, famously both dead and alive
at the same time - I believe the eminent Professor is both wrong and right at the
same time1.
Wrong because there are strong grounds for believing that computers will never
be able to replicate all human cognitive faculties and right because even such emas-
culated machines may still pose a threat to mankind’s future existence; an existential
threat, so to speak.
In a television interview on December 2nd 2014 Rory Cellan-Jones asked how far
engineers had come along the path towards creating artificial intelligence to which,
slightly alarmingly, Professor Hawking replied “Once humans develop artificial in-
telligence it would take off on its own and redesign itself at an ever increasing rate.
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Humans, who are limited by slow biological evolution, couldn’t compete, and would
be superseded”.
Although warranting headlines that week, such predictions are not new in the
world of science and science fiction; indeed my ex-colleague at the University of
Reading, Professor Kevin Warwick, made a very similar prediction back in 1997 in
his book “March of the Machines”. In the book Kevin observed that, even in 1997
there were already robots with the ‘brain power of an insect’; soon, he predicted,
there would be robots with the brain power of a cat, and soon after that there would
be machines as intelligent as humans. When this happens, Warwick predicted, the
science fiction nightmare of a ‘Terminator’ machine could quickly become real-
ity, because these robots will rapidly become more intelligent and superior in their
practical skills than the humans that designed and constructed them.
The notion of the singularity (with the accompanying vision of a future mankind
subjugated by evil machines) is based on the ideology that all aspects of human
mentality will eventually be instantiated by an artificial intelligence program run-
ning on a suitable computer; a so-called ‘Strong AI’2. Of course if this is possible,
accelerating progress in AI technologies - caused both by the use of AI systems
to design ever more sophisticated AIs and the continued doubling of raw computa-
tional power every two years as predicted by Moore’s law - will eventually cause
a runaway effect wherein the artificial intelligence will inexorably come to exceed
human performance on all tasks; the so-called point of [technological] ‘singularity’
popularised by the Google futurologist Ray Kurzweil [14].
And at the point this ‘singularity’ occurs, so Warwick, Kurzweil and Hawking
suggest, humanity will have effectively been “superseded” on the evolutionary lad-
der and will be obliged to eek out its autumn days listening to Pink Floyd and gar-
dening; or in some of Hollywood’s more dystopian visions, cruelly subjugated or
exterminated by ‘terminator’ machines.
I did not endorse these concerns in 1997 and do not do so now; although I do
share - for very different and mundane reasons that I will outline later - the worry
that artificial intelligence potentially poses a serious risk to humanity.
2 The humanity gap
There are many reasons why I am sceptical of grand claims made for future com-
putational artificial intelligence, not least empirical. This history of the subject is
littered with researchers who have claimed a breakthrough in AI as a result of their
research, only for it later to be judged harshly against the weight of society’s ex-
pectations. All too often these provide examples of what Hubert Dreyfus calls ‘the
first step fallacy’ [10] - undoubtedly climbing a tree takes a monkey a little nearer
2 Strong AI takes seriously the idea that one day machines will be built that can think, be conscious,
have genuine understanding and other cognitive states in virtue of their execution of a particular
program; in contrast weak AI does not aim beyond engineering the mere simulation of [human]
intelligent behaviour.
The Singularity, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love AI 3
the moon, but tree climbing will never deliver a would-be simian astronaut onto its
lunar surface.
In previous work I have identified at least three classical philosophico-technical
problems that illustrate why computational AI has historically failed, and will con-
tinue to fail, to deliver on its ‘Grand Challenge’ of replicating human mentality in
all its raw and electro-chemical glory [5] and I will briefly summarise these below.
2.1 Computers lack [phenomenal] consciousness.
In Science and Science Fiction the hope is periodically reignited that a computer
system will one day be conscious in virtue of its execution of an appropriate pro-
gram.; in moves towards this goal: World Scientific Publishing produce the ‘Interna-
tional Journal of Machine Consciousness’; the UK funding body EPSRC awarded
an Adventure Fund grant of around £500,000 to a team of ‘Roboteers and Psy-
chologists’ at Essex and Bristol universities, with a goal of instantiating machine
consciousness in a ‘humanoid-like’ robot called Cronos through appropriate com-
putational ‘internal modelling’ and already a group or researchers at the University
of Reading, led by Kevin Warwick, have claimed that robots they have developed
are “as conscious as a slug”.
Conversely, in an argument entitled Dancing with Pixies I demonstrated that if
a computer-controlled robot experiences a conscious sensation as it interacts with
the world, then an infinitude of ‘conscious sensation’ must be realised in all objects
throughout the universe: in this cup of tea that I am drinking as I write; in the seat
that I am sitting as I type, etc etc. If we reject such ‘panpsychism’, we must reject
‘machine consciousness’.
The underlying thread of the ‘Dancing with Pixies’ reductio [2], [3], [4] &[5]
derives from positions originally espoused by Hilary Putnam [30], Tim Maudlin
[18] and John Searle [33], with subsequent criticism from David Chalmers [8], Colin
Klein [13] and Ron Chrisley [9] amongst others [19].
In the DwP reductio, instead of seeking to secure Putnam’s claim that “every
open system implements every Finite State Automaton” (FSA) and hence that “psy-
chological states of the brain cannot be functional states of a computer”, I establish
the weaker result that, over a finite time window, every open physical system im-
plements the particular execution trace of a Finite State Automaton Q on a specific
input vector (I).
That this result leads to panpsychism is clear as, equating FSA Q(I) to a finite
computational system that is claimed to instantiate phenomenal states as it executes,
and employing Putnam’s state-mapping procedure to map a series of computational
states to any arbitrary non-cyclic sequence of states, we discover identical compu-
tational (and ex hypothesis phenomenal) states lurking in any open physical system
(e.g. a rock); then an infinitude of ‘disembodied experience of conscious sensation’
[dancing little pixies] are realised in everything ..
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Baldly speaking DwP is a simple reductio ad absurdum argument to demonstrate
that if the assumed claim is true (that an appropriately programmed computer really
does instantiate genuine phenomenal states) then panpsychism is true. However if,
against the backdrop of our immense scientific knowledge of the closed physical
world and the corresponding widespread desire to explain everything ultimately in
physical terms, we are led to reject panpsychism, then the DwP reductio leads us to
reject the claim that any formal computational processes could instantiate phenom-
enal consciousness.
2.2 Computers lack genuine understanding.
On the 25th June 2012, Google’s ‘Deep Learning’ technology was reported by the
New York Times to have been deployed to categorise unlabelled images. To do
this it was “turned loose on the Internet to learn on its own .. Presented with 10
million digital images found in YouTube videos, what did Googles brain do? What
millions of humans do with YouTube: looked for cats”. Le et al conjecture [15] ,
“The focus of this work is to build high-level, class-specific feature detectors from
unlabelled images. For instance, we would like to understand if it is possible to
build a face detector from only unlabelled images. This approach is inspired by
the neuro-scientific conjecture that there exist highly class-specific neurons in the
human brain, generally and informally known as ‘grandmother neurons’.”
At first sight, if such unsupervised ‘Deep Learning’ algorithms can learn to clas-
sify images of ‘faces, ‘cats and ‘human bodies’ from unlabelled images on the in-
ternet, then, it would seem that the work must go some way towards demonstrating
a genuine form of machine ‘understanding’ (in addition to potentially arbitrating on
the age old philosophical question of ‘natural kinds’3).
However a thought experiment from the American philosopher John Searle sug-
gests a note of caution. In the now (in)famous Chinese room argument Searle
demonstrated how it could be possible to program a computer to appear to un-
derstand, without it the machine actually understanding - in his thought experiment
Searle famously described how it might be possible to program a computer to com-
municate perfectly with human interlocutor in a language such as Chinese, without
the computer actually understanding anything of the interaction (cf. a small child
laughing at a joke she doesn’t understand)
Searle illustrates the point by demonstrating how he could follow the instructions
of the program - in computing parlance, we would say Searle is ‘dry running’ the
program - and carefully manipulating the squiggles and squiggles of the [to him]
meaningless Chinese ideographs as instructed by the program, without ever under-
3 In philosophy the term ‘natural kind’ is used to refer to a ‘natural’ grouping contra an artificial
one; an objective contra subjective set. There is considerable debate in analytic philosophy about
whether there are any natural kinds at all, since even plausible definitions of very familiar species
(such as the cat and dog) leave the classification of some exemplars ambiguous.
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standing a word of the Chinese ideographic responses the process is so methodically
cranking-out.
The essence of the Chines room argument is that syntax - the mere mechanical
manipulation [as if by computer] of uninterpreted symbols - is not sufficient for se-
mantics (meaning) to emerge. In this way Searle asserts that no mere computational
process can ever bring forth genuine understanding and hence that computation must
ultimately fail to fully instantiate mind4.
It is clear that Searle’s argument could just as easily target the claim that a Deep
Learning network understands the images it so adroitly processes5.
2.3 Computers lack [mathematical/creative] insight.
In his book The Emperor’s New Mind, the Oxford mathematical physicist Sir
Roger Penrose deployed Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem to argue that, in
general, the way mathematicians provide their ‘unassailable demonstrations’ of the
truth of certain mathematical assertions is fundamentally non-algorithmic and non-
computational. Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem states that “.. any effectively
generated theory capable of expressing elementary arithmetic cannot be both con-
sistent and complete. In particular, for any consistent, effectively generated formal
theory F that proves certain basic arithmetic truths, there is an arithmetical state-
ment that is true, but not provable in the theory.” The resulting true but unprovable
statement G(gˇ) is often referred to as ‘the Go¨del sentence’ for the theory (albeit
there are infinitely many other statements in the theory that share with the Go¨del
sentence the property of being true but not provable from the theory).
Arguments based on Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem - initially from John
Lucas [16] [17] - were criticised by Paul Benacerraf [1] then subsequently ex-
tended, developed and widely popularised by Roger Penrose [23] [24] [25] [26] -
typically endeavour to show that for any such formal system F , humans can find
the Go¨del sentence G(gˇ), whilst the computation/machine (being itself bound by F)
cannot.
4 See [28] for extended discussion of the Chinese room argument by twenty well known cognitive
scientists and philosophers.
5 This philosophical position recently given additional empirical weight in a critical follow up
paper from Szegedy et al [34] in which the researchers demonstrated that “we can cause the net-
work to misclassify an image by applying a certain imperceptible perturbation, which is found by
maximizing the networks prediction error. In addition, the specific nature of these perturbations
is not a random artefact of learning: the same perturbation can cause a different network, that
was trained on a different subset of the dataset, to misclassify the same input”; clearly whatever a
Deep Learning network is doing when it has learnt to classify unlabelled data, it has not demon-
strated that the “specificity of the ‘grandmother neuron’ could possibly be learned from unlabeled
data” or, expressed more colloquially, that such a network could shed light on the human ability to
categorise ‘cat’ images.
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In [24] Penrose develops a subtle reformulation of the vanilla argument that pur-
ports to show that “the human mathematician can ‘see’ that the Go¨del Sentence is
true for consistent F even though the consistent F cannot prove G(gˇ)”.
NB. A detailed discussion of Penrose’s formulation of the Go¨delian argument is
outside the scope of this chapter - for a critical introduction see [7] and for Pen-
rose’s response see [25] - here it is simply important to note that although Go¨delian-
style arguments purporting to show ‘computations are not necessary for cognition’
have been extensively and vociferously critiqued in the literature (see [29] for a
review), interest in them - both positive and negative - still regularly continues to
surface (e.g. [6] [35]), with Penrose and Hammeroof asserting that recent develop-
ments in physics have gone a long way to proving their case [27].
3 Artificial Intelligence and Artificial Stupidity
Taken together, these above arguments undermine the notion that the human mind
can be completely instantiated by mere computations; if correct, although computers
will undoubtedly get better and better at many particular tasks - say playing chess,
driving a car, predicting the weather etc - there will always remain broader aspects
of human mentality that future AI systems will not match. Under this conception
there is a ‘humanity-gap’ between the human mind and mere ‘digital computations’;
although raw computer power - and concomitant AI software - will continue to im-
prove, the combination of a human mind working alongside a future AI will continue
to be more powerful than that future AI system operating on its own; the singularity
will never be televised ..
Furthermore it seems to me that without understanding and consciousness of
the world and lacking genuine creative [mathematical] insight, any apparently goal
directed behaviour in a computer controlled robot is, at best, merely the reflection of
a deep rooted longing in its designer. Furthermore, lacking an ability to formulate
its own goals, on what basis would a robot set out to subjugate mankind unless,
of course, it was explicitly programmed to do so by its [human] engineer? But in
that case our underlying apprehension regarding future AI might better reflect the all
too real concerns surrounding current Autonomous Weapons Systems, than casually
re-indulging Hollywood’s vision of the post-human ‘Terminator’ machine.
Indeed, in my role as one of the AI experts co-opted onto the ‘International Com-
mittee for Robot Arms Control’ (ICRAC), I am particularly concerned by the po-
tential military deployment of robotic weapons systems - systems that can take de-
cisions to militarily engage without human intervention - precisely because current
AI is still very lacking and because of the underlying potential of poorly designed
interacting autonomous systems to rapidly escalate situations to catastrophic conclu-
sions; in my view such systems all too easily exhibit genuine ‘Artificial Stupidity’.
I am particularly sceptical that current and foreseeable AI technology can en-
able autonomous weapons systems to reliably comply with extant obligations under
International Humanitarian Law; specifically three core obligations: (i) to identify
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combatants from non-combatants; (ii) to make nuanced decisions regarding propor-
tionate responses to a complex military situation and (iii) to arbitrate on military or
moral necessity regarding when to apply force.
The extreme difficulty in lawfully identifying combatants from non-combatants
is powerfully highlighted in the following example from the Human Rights Watch
report “Losing humanity: the case against killer robots” [12]:
.. According to philosopher Marcello Guarini and computer scientist Paul Bello,“[i]n a con-
text where we cannot assume that everyone present is a combatant, then we have to figure
out who is a combatant and who is not. This frequently requires the attribution of intention.”
One way to determine intention is to understand an individuals emotional state, something
that can only be done if the soldier has emotions. Guarini and Bello continue, “A system
without emotion could not predict the emotions or action of others based on its own states
because it has no emotional states.” Roboticist Noel Sharkey echoes this argument: “Hu-
mans understand one another in a way that machines cannot. Cues can be very subtle, and
there are an infinite number of circumstances where lethal force is inappropriate.”
“For example, a frightened mother may run after her two children and yell at them to stop
playing with toy guns near a soldier. A human soldier could identify with the mothers
fear and the childrens game and thus recognize their intentions as harmless, while a fully
autonomous weapon might see only a person running toward it and two armed individuals.
The former would hold fire, and the latter might launch an attack. Technological fixes could
not give fully autonomous weapons the ability to relate to and understand humans that is
needed to pick up on such cues.”
In addition to the technical challenges of meeting obligations under International
Humanitarian Law, whenever autonomous systems interact without human supervi-
sion there is also a very real danger of catastrophic unintended escalation as under-
lying problems of ‘Artificial Stupidity’ forcefully come to bear ..
A light-hearted example demonstrating just how easily autonomous systems
can rapidly escalate situations out of control occurred in April 2011, when Peter
Lawrence’s book ‘The making of a fly’ was auto-priced upwards by two ‘trader-
bots’ competing against each other in the Amazon reseller market-place. The result
of this process is that Lawrence can now comfortably boast that his modest schol-
arly tract - first published in 1992 and currently out of print - was once valued by
one of the biggest and most respected companies on Earth at $23,698,655.93 (plus
$3.99 shipping).
As stark contrast, in “Machine gun-toting robots deployed on DMZ” a report in
‘Stars and Stripes’ magazine (July 12th, 2010), Jon Rabiroff outlines the following
terrifying scenario:
DEMILITARIZED ZONE, Korea Security along the DMZ has gone high-tech, as South
Korea has quietly installed a number of machine gun-armed robots to serve as the first line
of defense against the potential advance of North Korean soldiers.
The stationary robots which look like a cross between a traffic signal and a tourist-trap
telescope are more drone than Terminator in concept, operated remotely just outside the
southern boundary of the DMZ by humans in a nearby command center.
Officials refuse to say how many or where the robots have been deployed along the heavily
fortified border between the two Koreas, but did say they were installed late last month and
will be operated on an experimental basis through the end of the year.
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South Korean military officials will then decide how many, if any, robots they want comple-
menting the soldiers who man the area adjacent to the 2.5-mile-wide DMZ, which stretches
160 miles across the peninsula.
“The robots are not being deployed to replace or free up human soldiers,” said Huh Kwang-
hak, a spokesman for Samsung Techwin, the manufacturer of the SGR-1 robot. “Rather, they
will become part of the defense team with our human soldiers. Human soldiers can easily
fall asleep or allow for the depreciation of their concentration over time,” he said. “But
these robots have automatic surveillance, which doesnt leave room for anything resembling
human laziness. They also wont have any fear (of) enemy attackers on the front lines.”
South Korea Ministry of National Defense spokesman Kwon Ki-hyeon said his agency is
overseeing the project so he could not comment on theDMZrobot experiment. He referred
questions to Samsung Techwin.
Huh said no government officials would talk about the robots: “This experimental project is
highly classified.”
With armed robot border guards patrolling one side of the DMZ and the potential
for North Korea to respond in kind, the darkly dystopian ‘Science Fiction’ vision
of two quasi-autonomous robot armies squaring-up to each other begins to look all
too possible; furthermore, given that one of the protagonists is an unstable nuclear
armed state, the unintended dangers from a relatively minor military transgression,
say a minor border incursion, escalating into a very serious, potentially nuclear,
confrontation, begin to look alarmingly possible.
4 The body in question
I believe that the ‘Dancing with Pixies’ reductio, John Searle’s ‘Chinese Room Ar-
gument’ and Roger Penrose’ reflections on the non-computable nature of mathe-
matical insight suggest that we need to move away from purely computational ex-
planations of cognitive processes and instead reflect on how meaning, teleology and
human creative processes are fundamentally grounded in the human body, society
and the world; obliging us, in turn, to take issues of embodiment - the body and our
social embedding - much more seriously. And such a strong notion of embodiment
most certainly cannot be realised by simply co-opting a putative computational cre-
ative system into a conventional tin can robot6 ..
As Slawomir Nasuto and I set out in our recent discussion of Biologically con-
trolled animats7 and the so-called Zombie animals8 (two examples carefully chosen
to lie at polar ends of the spectrum of possible engineered robotic/cyborg systems),
because the induced behavioural couplings therein are not the effect of the intrin-
sic ‘nervous’ system’s constraints (metabolic or otherwise) at any level, a fortiori,
6 Whereby an appropriate AI is simply bolted onto a classical robot body and the particular material
of that ‘embodiment’ is effectively unimportant.
7 Robots controlled by a cultured-array of real biological neurons.
8 E.g. An animal whose behaviour is ‘remotely-controlled’, by an external experimenter, say by
optogenetics; see also Gradinaru et al [11], who used optogenetic techniques to stimulate neurons
selectively, inducing motor behaviour without requiring conditioning.
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merely instantiating appropriate sensorimotor coupling is not sufficient to instantiate
any meaningful intentional states [21].
On the contrary, in both Zombie animals and Biologically controlled animats
the sensorimotor couplings are actually the cause of extrinsic metabolic demands
(made via the experimenter’s externally directed manipulations). But since the ex-
perimenter drives the sensorimotor couplings in a completely arbitrary way (from
the perspective of the intrinsic metabolic needs of animal or its cellular constituents),
the actual causal relationship between the bodily milieu and the motor actions and
sensory readings can never be genuinely and appropriately coupled. Hence our con-
clusion (ibid) that only the right type and directionality of sensorimotor couplings
can ultimately lead to genuine understanding and intentionality.
In the light of such concerns, and until the challenges of the CRA, DwP and
the mystery of mathematical insight have been fully met and the role of embodi-
ment more strongly engaged (such that neurons, brain and body fully interact with
other bodies, world and society), I suggest a note of caution in labelling any artifi-
cial system as ‘strongly intelligent’ - a computational mind - in its own right; any
‘cognition’ displayed therein being merely a projection of its engineer’s intellect,
aesthetic judgement and desire.
5 Conclusion
Without having to fantasise that it has now, (or will ever), reach the level of super-
human intelligence that Professors Warwick and Hawking have graphically warned
us of, the all too real-world example of armed robots (as described above) precisely
illustrate why it is easy to concur that already current AI systems pose a real ‘exis-
tential threat’ to humanity; the threat of Artificial Stupidity. For this reason, in May
2014, members of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control gathered
in Geneva to participate in the first multilateral meeting ever held on Autonomous
Weapons Systems (LAWS); a debate that continues to this day at the very highest
levels of the UN; in a firm, but refracted, echo of Warwick and Hawking on AI - I
think we should be very concerned.
Nonetheless, it is equally obvious that even current-state AI has a rich potential to
transform society :- from the ‘trivial’ replacement of tedious human labour (e.g. by
controlling robots to clean the floor and mow the lawn); to a more complex new role
as an international social facilitator (by helping people communicate more easily
by instantaneously offering an approximate translation from one language to an-
other); to helping the State make substantially better use of scarce public resources
(e.g. one project that I was personally closely involved with - the UKPLC ‘SpendIn-
sight” system - was recently evaluated by the UK National Audit Office and used
to identify potential annual saving in the UK National Health Service purchasing
budget in excess of £500million per annum [22] [31]; clearly if such savings were
realised they would buy a significant number of additional frontline doctors, nurses
and drugs).
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Already, post ‘Lighthill’, post ‘connectionist winter’, post ‘Terminator blues’, the
recent practical realisation of ambitious real world, nouveau AI, machine learning,
big-data systems is tempting the engineered geek-in-me with too many lucrative,
new and seductive headline images; any one of which could so easily prompt me to
fall headstrong-in-love with AI again ..
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of London and Director of The Goldsmiths Centre for Intelligent Data Analytics
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